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Introduction
What would the Rehnquist Court do if faced with a conflict be-
tween its vision of federalism and its commitment to the separation
of powers? A case can be made that the abstention doctrines pres-
ent such a conflict and that the Court is aware of it. This Article
focuses on Younger abstention' because Younger is the paradigm of a
federalism-based restrictive jurisdictional doctrine. It is triggered
when the federal plaintiff is already a party in a pending state pro-
ceeding, if that proceeding involves essentially the same issues, im-
portant state interests are present, and the plaintiff will have a full
and fair opportunity to raise any federal issues in the state forum.2
Younger is abstention in name only. The plaintiff must remain in the
state system throughout the adjudication until United States
Supreme Court review is available. Chances of this review may be
slight, but the High Court is the only federal court the plaintiff will
ever see.
3
* Professor of Law, Boston College Law School.
1. The doctrine derives its name from Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). For
a discussion of Younger, see infra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
2. See generally C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 322-30 (4th ed. 1983)
(discussing the Younger doctrine and related case law).
3. A possible exception is where a state criminal defendant is granted federal
habeus corpus review in a federal district court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1988). The avail-
ability of federal habeus corpus for convicted state defendants is, however, increasingly
problematic.
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Younger thus cuts a large swath in federal trial court jurisdiction.
In terms of cases affected, it is probably the most significant of the
abstention doctrines.4 The effect on civil rights plaintiffs suing
under section 1983 is particularly telling.5 It is in such cases-based
on the defendant's acting under color of state law-that important
state interests are likely to be found.
The Court finds the basis for Younger in "principles of comity and
federalism."' 6 Critics have insisted that the Court's attachment to
these principles has led it to fashion bad jurisdictional law, thereby
"eviscerating [section] 1983"7 and downgrading the role of federal
courts in vindicating federal rights.8 As an object of liberal criti-
cism, Younger is hardly unique. The entire range of Burger-Rehn-
quist Court jurisdictional doctrines are attacked from within and
without the Court, often on similar grounds. 9 The problem for the
critics is that the arguments are mainly that-arguments. Take
standing, for example. The Court may seem incorrect, even woe-
fully so, in applying the harm-causation-redressability standard to a
given set of facts. 10 There is still usually room for some disagree-
ment, and that room increases as the issues are more broadly
framed. When the Court declines to imply a right of action from a
statute not expressly providing for one' it can be argued that this is
an improper approach to the role of courts in furthering statutory
objectives.' 2 It is surely defensible, however, to require Congress to
be somewhat specific about matters of remedy.'- Reasonable minds
may also differ with respect to the Court's elaborate edifice of Elev-
enth Amendment doctrine.' 4 The cases barring suits against states
4. See Levit, The Caseload Conundrum, Constitutional Restraint and the Manipulation of
Jurisdiction, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 321, 336 (1989) (stating that Younger is the broadest
of the abstention theories).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) provides as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within thejurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
6. Huffinan v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 602 (1975).
7. Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 346 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
8. E.g., id at 341-47; see Lee & Wilkins, An Analysis of Supplemental Jurisdiction and
Abstention with Recommendationsfor Legislative Action, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REv. 321, 354-55 (stat-
ing that a broad application of Younger would curtail federal jurisdiction greatly).
9. See, e.g., Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE LJ. 1425, 1425-26 (1987).
10. See, e.g., Nichol, Abusing Standing: A Comment on Allen v. Wright, 133 U. PA. L.
REv. 635, 635-42 (1985).
11. See, e.g., Transamerica Mortgage Advisors v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
12. See, e.g., Frankel, Implied Rights of Action, 67 VA. L. REv. 553, 567 (1981).
13. See Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 188-89 (1988) (Scalia, J., con-
curring).
14. On its face the Eleventh Amendment forbids suits against states in federal courts
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in federal courts are based largely on a reading of history that many
have questioned. 15 Perhaps the Court is wrong here too. That is
not to say that it has no authority to fashion this body of doctrine.
This can be said of Younger, however. 16 The debate over Younger is
different because serious questions of authority and legitimacy are
present. The federal plaintiff comes to the district court armed with
a federal cause of action-section 1983 plus an underlying provision
of federal law, usually the Constitution-and a valid grant of juris-
diction authorizing the tribunal to hear the case. 17 To send her
packing, the Court interposes neither the Constitution nor statutory
interpretation, but its own notions of comity and federalism. It
seems to be flouting the will of Congress in an area over which Con-
gress has clear authority: the jurisdiction of the federal courts.' 8
This step is surprising for a Court that often emphasizes the author-
ity of Congress over federal jurisdiction 19 and is generally deferen-
tial to the legislative branch.
20
Younger abstention can thus be viewed solely as a separation of
powers issue.21 It is a separation of powers problem in the literal
sense that the Court is making law regarding federal jurisdiction
that seems at odds with congressional statutes on the subject. It is
also a separation of powers problem in a broader, structural sense.
Even if specific legislative language does not resolve all jurisdic-
tional questions, for the Court to develop a body of jurisdictional
law is to exceed the judiciary's constitutional bounds and trespass
on the legislature's domain. If either of these forms of the critique
is valid, the logic of the Court's general position of deference to
Congress would require the federalism-based, judge-made doctrine
of Younger to yield. The critique emerges not as another argument
but as an end to an argument.
So far the Court has largely dealt with the separation of powers
problem by ignoring it. The Younger cases say little about the source
by noncitizens and foreigners. In Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), however, the
Court extended the amendment to a damages action by a citizen against his own state.
Post-Hans doctrine has grown into a complex set of rules that, for example, permit citi-
zens to sue their own states for equitable relief (so long as they do not name the state as
defendant) and permit Congress to remove the states' immunity from suit (at least if it
follows special drafting rules). For a survey of these developments, see Brown, Has the
Supreme Court Confessed Error on the Eleventh Amendment? Revisionist Scholarship and State Im-
munity, 68 N.C.L. REv. 867 (1990).
15. E.g., Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpreta-
tion, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889 (1983).
16. The principal articulation of this critique is Redish, Abstention, Separation of Pow-
ers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71 (1984).
17. Jurisdiction might be based on section 1343(a)(3) of title 28, the jurisdictional
counterpart of section 1983, or on section 1331 of title 28, the general federal question
jurisdiction statute. The latter no longer contains a minimum jurisdictional amount.
Federal Question Jurisdictional Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-486, 94 Stat.
2369.
18. See, e.g., Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 343-44 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
19. E.g., Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1987).
20. See infra notes 139-44 and accompanying text.
21. Professor Redish takes this position in his article. Redish, supra note 16, at 74.
He makes it clear, however, that he also disagrees with Younger as a matter of policy. Id
at 71-72 & n.5.
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of the Court's authority to renounce jurisdiction based on notions
of comity and federalism. How to reconcile this renunciation with
federal statutory law is discussed even less. Recent abstention cases
suggest, however, that the Court is aware of the separation of pow-
ers problem and deeply troubled by it.22 The Court increasingly has
invoked the "virtually unflagging obligation" of the federal courts
to exercise the jurisdiction conferred upon them.23 In New Orleans
Public Service Inc. (NOPSI) v. City Council,24 decided last year, the
Court went so far as to state that "[o]ur cases have long supported
the proposition that federal courts lack the authority to abstain from
the exercise of the jurisdiction that has been conferred. ' 25 It then
reversed a lower court's plausible application of Younger to state ad-
ministrative proceedings. 26 Younger is anything but dead, as the 1987
decision in Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco,2 7 shows; but the notion of a "virtu-
ally unflagging obligation" of a federal court to exercise thejurisdic-
tion granted cuts against the doctrine.28 The same reasoning is at
work in the apparent curtailment of other abstention doctrines.
29
So-called Colorado River abstention ° has been all but eliminated on
precisely this ground.3 1
This Article examines the separation of powers critique of Younger
and the Court's apparent concern with it. The critique is forceful,
particularly in its text-based (as opposed to institutional) form, but
is not the "irrebuttable" weapon that its major proponent has
claimed.3 2 The Article begins by looking for support of the critique
in the Court's recent cases addressing separation of powers issues,33
but finds that these decisions do not support the separation of pow-
ers critique. Rather, they emphasize a cooperative system of shared
22. E.g., New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. (NOPSI) v. City Council, 109 S. Ct. 2506
(1989).
23. Id at 2513 (quoting Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 203 (1988)).
24. 109 S. Ct. 2506 (1989).
25. Id at 2512.
26. Id at 2520.
27. 481 U.S. 1 (1987). In Pennzoil the Court extended Younger abstention to state
civil proceedings between private parties in which the state had the tangential interest of
protecting from attack its post-judgment procedures giving the judgment creditor rights
over the defendant's property. Id. at 10-17.
28. Indeed, as discussed below, if one focuses on the notion of an obligation to
exercise jurisdiction conferred, it is hard to see how abstention in any form is permissi-
ble. See infra notes 243-52 and accompanying text.
29. E.g., NOPSI, 109 S. Ct. at 2513-15 (declining to apply Burford abstention).
30. This doctrine takes its name from Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v.
United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
31. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 15
(1983).
32. Redish, supra note 16, at 110.
33. E.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989); Morrison v. Olson, 487
U.S. 654 (1988).
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functions in which Younger abstention looks quite at home.34 Show-
ing concern for the nation's judicial system as a whole, and striving
to maintain a federal-state balance seem appropriate for the
Supreme Court.3 5 Moreover, the separation of powers critique
leaves no room for any exercise of abstention at all. Even Justice
Brennan, the Court's strongest critic of Younger on separation of
powers grounds, did not advocate taking the critique this far.8 6 Of
course if Congress has spoken, that is the end of the matter regard-
less of what would be sound policy. Thus, the Article examines in
detail the relevant statutes and the text-based critique's application
to them.3 7 The ultimate question, however, is not one of language,
but of how to approach the broad general allocations of authority in
the jurisdictional grants and the broad remedial structure estab-
lished by section 1983. Perhaps that is the main point: with Younger
as with other jurisdictional doctrines, issues of policy will not go
away even if labelled separation of powers.
Policy though it may be, however, the separation of powers cri-
tique has enough force to greatly trouble the current Court. The
Article concludes with an analysis of how the Court has manifested
this concern and where it might lead.3 8 Younger is not about to van-
ish, but a period of reexamination and likely retrenchment has
surely set in. The Court appears anxious both to legitimize the doc-
trine and to limit it. Perhaps these goals can be achieved through
application of theories of activist statutory construction or vigorous
federal common law. Neither is likely to appeal to the Rehnquist
Court. Alternativejustification can be found in notions of equity, or
in the basic Article III concept of the "judicial power." What will
drive the Court to seek and articulate a justification is that Younger
presents a tension between respect for state processes and adher-
ence to the role which Congress has prescribed for the judiciary.
Perhaps when the Court's rethinking progresses, Younger will
emerge as a mid-point-an attempt to harmonize the two impera-
tives. -Having now seen the matter as a separation of powers prob-
lem, the Court will probably tilt away from federalism, so to speak,
and carve out a narrower doctrine. Fears that Younger would emerge
as "The Beast that Ate New York City" can, in any event, be put to
rest.
34. This point is developed infra at Part II.
35. See Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, 481 U.S. 1, 11 n.9 (1987) (stating that abstention
doctrines "reflect a complex of considerations designed to soften the tensions inherent
in a system that contemplates parallel judicial processes").
36. Justice Brennan concurred in Younger, 401 U.S. at 75. He has, however, been
extremely critical of the extensions of Younger, largely on the ground that they run
counter to the intent of Congress. See, e.g., Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 341-45 (1977)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
37. See infra notes 214-42 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 268-318 and accompanying text.
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I. Younger Abstention, Its Reaches and Vulnerabilities
A. Younger, Its Extensions and Some General Critiques
Younger originated in the criminal context, but soon showed itself
capable of extraordinary growth. The plaintiff in Younger v. Harris3 9
brought a section 198340 action in federal court to enjoin a state
criminal proceeding in which he was a defendant. He challenged
the state statute under which he was being prosecuted as violative of
the First Amendment. The Supreme Court directed dismissal of the
section 1983 proceeding. Justice Black's opinion for the Court con-
tains several different strands. One, which is largely ignored in later
Younger cases, is the view that a pre-enforcement challenge to a state
statute on its face presents serious problems of ripeness under Arti-
cle III.41 Had the decision rested on this ground, there would be no
Younger doctrine as that term is used today.42 The doctrine instead
is based on Justice Black's analysis of the bearing on the federal case
of pending state criminal proceedings. Asking the federal court to
enjoin those proceedings presented a classic equity problem: the
plaintiff sought equitable relief when he appeared to have an ade-
quate remedy at law. He could challenge the state statute as a de-
fense to the criminal proceeding. Had the decision stopped here, it
would have been an important federal equity decision, 43 but there
would still be no "Younger doctrine." What gives the decision its
extraordinary force is Justice Black's election to move beyond equity
and invoke principles of "comity" to elevate the pendency of state
proceedings to the dispositive reason for the federal court to abstain
from hearing the case. He defined comity as
a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that
the entire country is made up of a Union of separate state govern-
ments, and a continuance of the belief that the National Govern-
ment will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free
to perform their separate functions in their separate ways.44
With this broad and fundamental basis, Younger abstention soon
emerged as a doctrine that requires the federal courts not to inter-
fere with state proceedings in a wide range of contexts, including
39. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
41. Younger, 401 U.S. at 52-54.
42. Cf Redish, supra note 16, at 93-94 (discussing First Amendment analysis of
Younger).
43. In particular, Younger cut back on the seemingly hospitable approach to injunc-
tive relief for plaintiffs with First Amendment claims that the Court had shown in Dom-
browski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
44. Younger, 401 U.S. at 44.
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civil nuisance actions, 45 contempt proceedings, 46 proceedings to re-
view parental fitness,47 and at least some administrative actions.
48
While all of these cases involve significant participation by state gov-
ernment actors, the Court has extended Younger to private civil pro-
ceedings in which the state plays an ancillary role.49 The doctrine
may not be limited to cases seeking equitable relief. In an action for
damages based on allegedly unconstitutional administration of tax
laws, for example, the Court relied in part on Younger in directing
dismissal.50 A major theme in all these cases is respect for the state
judiciary's ability to resolve federal issues, and the desire not to in-
terfere with its performance of this function.5'
The Younger doctrine, both in the original decision and its exten-
sions, contains many uncertainties and is open to a range of criti-
cisms. 52 The source of law itself is open to question. The various
opinions suggest that Younger rests on a statute,53 is not statutorily
based,54 reflects principles of equity, 55 and goes beyond equity to
more fundamental principles of comity and federalism.56 Whatever
the source, the Court has not been forthright in discussing its au-
thority to utilize that source, given the possibility that statutes ad-
dress the matter directly. Another methodological weakness is that
though Younger appears to represent a kind of balancing of federal
and state interests, the nature and weight of the federal interest is
not adequately discussed. As for the other side, the Court often
lumps under the heading "important state interest" both the state's
role as adjudicator of disputes and its concern with the underlying
subject matter.
5 7
45. Huffinan v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
46. Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977).
47. Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979).
48. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Schools, 477 U.S. 619 (1986).
49. Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, 481 U.S. 1 (1987). For a discussion of Pennzoi see
Althouse, The Misguided Search for State Interest in Abstention Cases: Observations on the Occa-
sion of Pennzoil v. Texaco, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1051 (1988).
50. Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100 (1981).
51. See, e.g., Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 445-46 (1977). The Court also
analyzes the state's interest in the underlying subject matter of the litigation. E.g., id at
444 (noting the state interest in its welfare programs).
52. See, e.g., Redish, The Doctrine of Younger v. Harris: Deference in Search of a Ration-
ale, 63 CORNEL. L. REV. 463, 473-77 (1978).
53. In Younger itselfJustice Black stated that dismissal was required because of "the
national policy forbidding federal courts to stay or enjoin pending state court proceed-
ings except under special circumstances." 401 U.S. at 41. His opinion suggests that the
policy is both reflected in and derived from the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283
(1988), which has been on the books since 1793. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43.
54. In Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975),Justice Rehnquist made it clear
that the judicial policy embodied in Younger is separate and distinct from any statutory
source. Id at 600 n. 15.
55. Younger can be read as an equity decision, and efforts have been made to so
confine it. See, e.g., Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 339 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring).
56. The post-Younger decisions have moved away from the equity rationale. In
Huffran, for example, Justice Rehnquist referred to "the principles of comity and feder-
alism on which Younger is based." 420 U.S. at 602.
57. In Huffnan the majority stated that "interference with a state judicial proceeding
prevents the state not only from effectuating its substantive policies, but also from con-
tinuing to perform the separate function of providing a forum competent to vindicate
any constitutional objections interposed against those policies." Id at 604. However,
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A different critique of Younger focuses on the extension of the doc-
trine beyond the narrow contours of state criminal trials.58 The ra-
tionale for abstention in the criminal context is that though federal
courts having jurisdiction should act on the plaintiff's federal cause
of action, interference with an ongoing criminal proceeding is in-
deed a drastic step. Equity's tradition of restraint calls for absten-
tion in this context but it is equity itself rather than any broader
considerations of comity and federalism that governs. Even though
Younger may have transposed equity to the federal-state context, the
decision should be limited in accord with equity's special deference
to the criminal law.59 Thus the Court was unfaithful to Younger's
foundations when it called for abstention in favor of a state civil nui-
sance proceeding, even if that case could plausibly be labelled quasi-
criminal.6
0
Underlying these critiques of Younger abstention is a more funda-
mental argument: that the Court has exalted notions ofjudicial fed-
eralism over a proper concern for the role of national tribunals in
the vindication of national rights.6 1 As Justice Brennan frequently
reminded his brethren, the Civil War amendments and ensuing leg-
islation transformed the role of federal courts: "the lower federal
courts 'ceased to be restricted tribunals of fair dealing between citi-
zens of different states and became the primary and powerful reli-
ances for vindicating every right given by the Constitution, the laws,
and treaties of the United States.' ",62 Younger goes against the spirit
of this development in our federal structure. Its focus on the capac-
ity of state courts to handle federal issues is simply misplaced, even
if they can do so as well as federal courts.63
Criticisms of Younger on the basis of policy and doctrine have
force, but in many respects they mirror the weakness of general crit-
icisms of Burger-Rehnquist Court federal jurisdictional doctrine al-
luded to above: there are arguments to be made on both sides.
Take the equity-based critique of the extension cases, for example.
the dominant thrust behind the extensions of Younger is respect for state courts. If this
respect is key, the nature of the underlying proceeding might well make no difference
given the fact that the state's role as adjudicator is constant. See, e.g., Juidice, 430 U.S. at
344-45 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (decrying the Court's "ultimate goal of denying § 1983
plaintiffs the federal forum in any case, civil or criminal, when a pending state proceed-
ing may hear the federal plaintiff's federal claims").
58. See, e.g., Huffman, 420 U.S. at 613-16 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
59. Id at 613-14 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
60. Id
61. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 9, at 1425-26.
62. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 464 (1974) (quoting F. FRANKFURTER & J.
LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 65 (1928)).
63. See, e.g., Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 456 (1977) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting).
1i nnn I1Q1
The cases involving civil nuisance and civil contempt are not crimi-
nal cases, but they serve many of the same functions of vindicating
the authority of the state.64 If this interest triggered restraint in the
criminal context, the Court has not bent the doctrine beyond recog-
nition by applying it in the quasi-criminal context. The argument is
that the Court is wrong. Similarly, calls for better balancing do not
invalidate the process of balancing.
Questions of the Court's authority to look to comity and of the
proper role of the federal judiciary, however, raise issues of a differ-
ent order. They suggest that positive law-either the Constitution
or federal statutes-speaks to the matter authoritatively and directs
the federal courts to hear the cases in question. If so, Younger ab-
stention is not simply a wrong policy conclusion; it is illegitimate.
Thus, the most telling critique of Younger is not based on policy but
on considerations of separation of powers. The next subsection
takes a preliminary look at this critique.
B. The Separation of Powers Critique: A Preliminary Examination
Underlying the separation of powers critique are basic premises
about Congress's powers under Article III and Article 1.65 Congress
has plenary power over the jurisdiction of federal courts. Lower
federal courts, in particular, can hear no case unless Congress has
authorized it. Indeed, Congress is under no constitutional duty to
create those courts at all.6 6 Article III does impose some limits on
the cases Congress can assign. For example, a state law action be-
tween nondiverse parties would be outside the federal judicial
power. Other provisions of the Constitution may impose limits on
Congress's power to deny jurisdiction in particular instances, 67 but
these limits are largely theoretical and do not detract from the force
of the general premise of legislative power over judicial business.
A jurisdictional statute such as section 1331 of title 28 is an exer-
cise of that power.68 It represents a legislative judgment that a class
of cases can be brought in federal court. To paraphrase a famous
passage in Gary v. Curtis,6 9 the statute is an exercise of Congress's
64. See, e.g., Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 335-37 (1977); Huffinan, 420 U.S. at 603-
07.
65. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 provides:
The Congress shall have Power To constitute Tribunals inferior to the
Supreme Court.
66. See Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 448-49 (1850); C. WRIGirr, supra note
2, at 36-39 (discussing the theory that Congress must vest all federal jurisdiction in some
courts).
67. See Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated
Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STA. L. REv. 895 (1984). In theory, a denial ofjurisdic-
tion to assert specified federal rights would act to abridge those rights, and thus would
violate the constitutional provisions establishing those rights. See generally Tribe,Jurisdic-
tional Gerrymandering Zoning Disfavored Rights out of the Federal Courts, 16 HARv. C.R.-C.L.
L. REv. 129 (1981).
68. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988) reads:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.
69. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236 (1845).
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choice as to "the exact degrees and character" 70 of federal jurisdic-
tion. A federal court must honor this choice. Just as that court
could not take a case beyond its jurisdiction, it follows from the con-
gressional mandate that the Court cannot refuse to take a case
within the congressional mandate. Thus presented, the separation
of powers critique of Younger is initially based on legislative text.
The point is not simply that Congress rather than the Court has the
power over jurisdiction, but that it has exercised that power. The
courts' general duty in a tripartite system is to apply the law. 71 This
duty encompasses jurisdictional statutes just as much as any other
law.
One can find the textual separation of powers critique as early as
Justice Douglas's dissent in Younger itself.72 He cited the Civil Rights
Act of 1871 as a direct congressional authorization to hear the
case. 73 That statute contains both a right of action-now section
1983-and a grant ofjurisdiction over cases within it. While Justice
Douglas's brief analysis focuses on section 1983 as an exception
to the Anti-Injunction Act,74 it contains the seeds of future
developments.
Particularly important is the presence of section 1983. That stat-
ute provides a remedy for the violation of underlying rights found
elsewhere, primarily in the Constitution. Without such a statute the
ability of litigants to sue to enforce those rights against officials act-
ing under color of state law would be uncertain. 75 Congress not
only conferred that ability, but gave the litigant a choice of forum,
or at least the clear availability of a federal forum. It did so through
the jurisdictional component of the 1871 Act. Thus, while section
1983 is not, strictly speaking, jurisdictional, it represents a congres-
sional choice about remedies that is substantially grounded in Con-
gress's power over the jurisdiction of the federal courts.
Justice Brennan's separate opinions in cases extending the Younger
doctrine beyond its original context of federal equitable relief
against state criminal proceedings represent the major judicial elab-
oration of the text-based separation of powers critique.7 6 He was a
70. Id at 245.
71. Redish, supra note 16, at 76-77 (quoting in part Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill,
437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978)).
72. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 58 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
73. Id at 61-62.
74. Id at 60-64 (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 2283).
75. The Court ultimately might have reached this result through the process that it
utilized in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388 (1971). In Bivens a majority reasoned that even without a general authorizing
statute such as section 1983 a federal court with jurisdiction over the subject matter
could award damages against a federal official for a constitutional violation. The analy-
sis relies heavily on the general remedial powers of federal courts. Id at 395-96.
76. E.g., Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, 481 U.S. 1, 18 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring in
1 QQfi
strong critic of these extensions. He found in section 1983, its juris-
dictional counterpart, and the general federal question grant a post-
Civil War policy to establish the federal courts as the principal fo-
rum for vindicating federal rights. 77 In part this policy is institu-
tional: federal courts may be potentially more fair than state courts
in vindicating those rights. 7s In part, however, the forum choice it-
self is one of the rights the national government has conferred. 79
To vindicate that right the federal courts must exercise the jurisdic-
tion given them. Although Justice Brennan did not use the term
separation of powers, it seems fair to apply this label to much of his
criticism of Younger abstention. The key point for him was the pres-
ence of authoritative texts of positive law, emanating from the legis-
lative branch, which the judicial branch must follow.
The major academic development of this critique as a matter of
separation of powers is an influential article by Professor Redish.80
Although he disagrees with Younger as a matter of policy,81 for Red-
ish that is not the important point. He describes arguments for ab-
stention based on comity and federalism as addressed to the wrong
forum.8 2 The Court cannot entertain these arguments because
Congress has settled the issue by conferring jurisdiction. It is Con-
gress's job to make the laws.8 3 The Court would violate basic no-
tions of separation of powers if it declined to enforce a substantive
law because of disagreement with its policy. The same violation oc-
curs when the Court directs abstention from the exercise of granted
jurisdiction in favor of state processes.8 4 Like Justice Brennan's ap-
proach, the presence of legislative texts is central to Redish's argu-
ment. He goes further by analyzing the texts themselves. He finds
the grants of jurisdiction "seemingly unlimited."8 5
The text-based form of the separation of powers critique is its
most apparent component. In part, the text-based critique rests on
the fact that the laws exist, as well as on what they say. Whether the
texts, by their own terms, forbid or permit abstention is a difficult
the judgment); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 342 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 613 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting). For an
early and extensive formulation of Justice Brennan's views, see Perez v. Ledesma, 401
U.S. 82, 104 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
77. E.g., Perez, 401 U.S. at 106-07 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
78. E.g., Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 464 n.13 (1974).
79. See, e.g., Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 455-56 (1977) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
80. Redish, supra note 16. The article is an important component of the academic
treatment of Younger and of abstention in general. See, e.g., Shapiro,Jurisdiction and Dis-
cretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 543, 544 (1985) (discussing Professor Redish's article); Wells,
Why Professor Redish is Wrong About Abstention, 19 GA. L. REv. 1097 (1985).
81. Redish, supra note 16, at 72 n.5.
82. Id at 73.
83. Id. at 76-77; see Lee & Wilkins, supra note 8, at 367 (stating that "Younger as
applied today calls for legislative modification simply to preserve Congress' constitu-
tional authority to delineate the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts").
84. Redish, supra note 16, at 76-77.
85. Id at 77-78.
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question. Further discussion of this form of the separation of pow-
ers critique is postponed for the moment because of the possibility
that that critique can be presented in an even more compelling
fashion.
It is true that if Congress had not spoken, there would be no ques-
tion of abstention because the federal court would have no jurisdic-
tion to renounce. The important consideration may be neither what
Congress said nor the fact that it said anything at all. An alternative
separation of powers objection to Younger is that it represents judge-
made jurisdictional law, and that in our tripartite system only Con-
gress can make law of this type. AsJustice Brennan put it, objecting
to the reach of Younger, "[t]he power to control the jurisdiction of
the lower federal courts is assigned by the Constitution to Congress,
not to this Court."8 6 Thus, the separation of powers critique can be
recast in institutional terms. The point is not that the Court is indi-
rectly violating the Constitution by disobeying the will of Congress
but that it is directly violating the Constitution by leaving its own
domain and entering that of another branch. Stating the argument
in these terms may bring to bear the doctrine of separation of pow-
ers in an even stronger form. If the recast critique holds, Younger is
indeed illegitimate. In fact the institutional critique might render
questions of statutory interpretation irrelevant: Congress may lack
power to delegate jurisdictional lawmaking to the judicial branch.
8 7
In order to consider the critique in this form one must consider the
relatively new development of an extensive body of "separation of
powers law." These cases are particularly relevant to an analysis of
the validity of Younger solely as a matter of separation of powers.
II. Guidance from the Separation of Powers Cases
During the last decade the Burger-Rehnquist Court decided a
number of separation of powers cases.88 Almost overnight the doc-
trine evolved from an abstraction to a significant component of op-
erative constitutional law. These cases offer some support for the
separation of powers critique of Younger.8 9 One of their dominant
recent themes, however-the need for a flexible approach and a
86. Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 125 (1981) (Bren-
nan, J., concurring).
87. For a discussion of delegated lawmaking authority, see Mistretta v. United
States, 488 U.S. 361, 383-97 (1989).
88. See, e.g., id; Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988); Commodity Futures Trad-
ing Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986);
Thomas v. Union Carbide Corp., 473 U.S. 568 (1985); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919
(1983); Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
89. Part III, infra, discusses other cases relevant to and somewhat supportive of the
critique-those dealing with federalism as a constitutional value and with the limited
nature of federal jurisdiction.
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sharing of functions among the three branches-suggests that there
is room for courts to make jurisdictional law.
In the early Burger Court separation of powers cases, flexibility
was not the key. Instead, the Court emphasized the need to confine
the three branches to their respective spheres. A good example is
Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha,90 in which the Court
struck down one-house legislative veto mechanisms. The Court
stated its general view that the Constitution "sought to divide the
delegated powers of the new Federal Government into three de-
fined categories, Legislative, Executive, and Judicial, to assure, as
nearly as possible, that each branch of government would confine it-
self to its assigned responsibility."9 1 The specific ground for the decision
was the conclusion that a resolution by one house suspending a de-
cision not to deport an alien was the making of a law, and did not
comply with the Article I procedures for the exercise of legislative
power.92 The Court emphasized, however, that these provisions
must be seen in a broader context; they "are integral parts of the
constitutional design for the separation of powers."9 3
Chadha is striking in its rigidity. The majority emphasized that a
strict application of the separation doctrine is the rule even if it op-
erates to strike down important governmental innovations. 94 In-
deed, Justice White, in dissent, portrayed the decision as
undercutting the constitutional foundations of the modern adminis-
trative state.95 Chadha does not stand alone. The same rigidity char-
acterizes Bowsher v. Synar,96 which invalidated the Comptroller
General's role under the Balanced Budget Act, and Northern Pipeline
Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co.,97 which invalidated adjudica-
tion of bankruptcy disputes by non-Article III judges.
Taken together these cases constitute support for the institutional
version of the separation of powers critique of Younger. When the
Court makes jurisdictional law it is no longer "confin[ing] itself to
its assigned responsibility. '9 8 Congressional power over jurisdic-
tion represents, if anything, more than ordinary lawmaking. It flows
from Congress's special responsibility for the business of the federal
courts, given the framers' decision not to create a system of lower
federal courts but to leave that choice to Congress.
Chadha, Bowsher, and Northern Pipeline do not, however, represent
90. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
91. Id at 951 (emphasis added).
92. Id at 952-59.
93. Id. at 946.
94. Id at 959.
95. Id. at 984-87 (White, J., dissenting) (discussing the validity of rulemaking).
96. 478 U.S. 714 (1986). In Bowsher the Court held that the Comptroller General's
role under the Act was executive and that Congress's ability to remove him on grounds
broader than those generally applicable to impeachment, gave it too much power over
the executive branch. Id. at 732-34.
97. 458 U.S. 50 (1982). Although there was no majority opinion in Northern Pipeline,
the decision appears to rest on the view that certain matters require adjudication in an
Artide III court at least to a substantial degree. Id at 87.
98. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 957.
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the last word in the development of separation of powers doctrine.
The more recent cases appear to take the flexible approach to the
issue called for by Justice White in his early dissents. 99 In Thomas v.
Union Carbide00 and Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor' 01
the Court backed away from Northern Pipeline almost to the point of
overruling the case.' 0 2 These cases rest on the premise that "an
absolute construction of Article III is not possible"' 0 3 as a guide to
determining where adjudicatory functions belong. The opinions
decry an approach which is "formalistic,"'10 4 "doctrinaire,"' 0 5 or
which uses "bright line" rules.'0 6 The Court states the general goal
of separation of powers as preventing "the encroachment or ag-
grandizement of one branch at the expense of the other."' 0 7
The most dramatic example of this flexible approach is Morrison v.
Olson, 10 8 the "special prosecutor case." There the Court rejected a
number of challenges to the validity of a court-appointed special
prosecutor charged with investigating and prosecuting wrongdoing
in the executive branch, with very little executive branch control
over her actions. The challenges were based both on specific consti-
tutional provisions allocating responsibility and on the doctrine of
separation of powers in general. With respect to the latter, the
Court invoked Justice Jackson's call for a flexible doctrine' 0 9 and
determined that the scheme did not authorize a "usurpation" of ex-
ecutive branch functions" 1 0 by another branch. In Mistretta v. United
States,"' the Court upheld the promulgation of sentencing guide-
lines by the United States Sentencing Commission. Again, in the
face of separation of powers challenges, the Court elaborated on the
need for a "flexible"" 2 approach and determined that the use of the
somewhat hybrid Commission would not "either accrete to a single
branch power more appropriately diffused among separate branches
or... undermine the authority and independence of one or another
coordinate branch.""13
99. See, e.g., idL
100. 473 U.S. 568 (1985).
101. 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
102. See Brown, Article III as a Fundamental Value-The Demise of Northern Pipeline and
Its Implicationsfor Congressional Power, 49 OHIO ST. LJ. 55 (1988).
103. Thomas, 473 U.S. at 583.
104. Schor, 478 U.S. at 851.
105. Thomas, 473 U.S. at 587.
106. I& at 586.
107. Schor, 478 U.S. at 850 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976)).
108. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
109. Id at 694 (quoting Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,
635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
110. Id at 695.
111. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
112. Id at 381.
113. Id at 382.
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The approach of these recent cases generally cuts against the in-
stitutional separation of powers critique of Younger abstention. It
may well be that Congress has a special responsibility for the juris-
diction of the federal courts-an "ultraplenary" power so to
speak. 1 4 It does not follow, however, that that responsibility can-
not be shared to any degree." 5 Younger abstention flows from a
choice by the Court to consider the harmonious functioning of the
nation's parallel court systems in determining whether to exercise
federal jurisdiction, primarily in the equitable context. It is hard to
view this consideration as threatening Congress's integrity or imper-
missibly accumulating legislative power within the judicial branch.
The choices made are closely related to the traditional function of
adjudicating cases and controversies. It seems unduly facile to
equate the exercise of ungranted jurisdiction with a decision not to
exercise what is granted. The former represents an exercise of
power given only to Congress by the Constitution. The latter repre-
sents a power that might be inherent in courts that possess "the
judicial power," and that act according to the precepts of "law and
equity." Alternatively, Congress may have delegated the power to
decline jurisdiction in the relevant statutes, a point discussed in Part
IV below." 16 What is important for institutional separation of pow-
ers purposes is Congress's primacy in the area; that is retained by its
apparent power to nullify Younger or any other abstention doctrine.
Apart from the general bearing of the recent cases on the institu-
tional critique, Morrison and Mistretta contain important specific dis-
cussions of the range of things the judicial branch may do in a
system of shared separated powers. In Morrison the Court noted
that "federal courts and judges have long performed a variety of
functions that... do not necessarily or directly involve adversarial
proceedings within a trial or appellate court."' 1 7 It cited supervi-
sion of grand juries and the appointment of private prosecutors for
some contempt proceedings.lis This discussion took place in the
context of a challenge to the judiciary's assertedly executive role in
the special prosecutor scheme. Far more relevant for present pur-
poses is the promulgation of sentencing guidelines by the Commis-
sion at issue in Mistretta. The statute places the Commission within
the judicial branch and provides that at least three of its seven mem-
bers must be federal judges. 19 In Mistretta a federal criminal de-
fendant sentenced pursuant to the guidelines contended that their
promulgation was an impermissible legislative act by the judicial
branch. As such Congress could not authorize it. In response, the
Court admitted that the guidelines look a lot like laws.' 20 They are
114. Cf. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273, 2282 (1989) (discussing and
rejecting the notion of the Fourteenth Amendment as an ultraplenary grant).
115. See Shapiro, supra note 80, at 577.
116. See infra notes 234-40 and accompanying text.
117. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 681 n.20.
118. Id
119. 28 U.S.C. § 991 (1988).
120. Mistreta, 488 U.S. at 391.
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the major determinants of each sentence and are presumptively
binding on federal trial judges. In the words of the Court, they re-
flect "political judgment about crime and criminality" and have
"substantive effects."' 121
This last point is particularly significant. The Court relied in part
on the form of judicial rulemaking that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure represent.' 22 Still, the Court seemed to recognize that
under a substantive-procedural dichotomy the guidelines fall on the
substantive side.' 23 This recognition was troubling. The Court em-
phasized that the guidelines "do not bind or regulate the primary
conduct of the public."' 24 Even so, the Court seemed to accept the
characterization ofJustice Scalia who, in dissent, labelled the guide-
lines "legally binding prescriptions governing application of gov-
ernmental power against private individuals."' 2 5 The Court was
able to overcome its reservations about this lawmaking for two main
reasons. First, sentencing represents a "unique context" in that
courts have always played a large role in the sentencing process. 126
Second, the Sentencing Commission is not a court and its
nonadjudicatory activities do not threaten the "central adjudicatory
mission" of the judicial branch.' 2
7
Even if one accepts these distinctions, Mistretta is a separation of
powers case that supports the making of rules by the judicial branch
that pertain to the disposition of cases by the federal judiciary. One
could apply the definition, at some level of generality, to the Younger
doctrine. While it is true that there was a delegation issue in Mis-
tretta, the case did not involve the question of whether Congress had
or had not delegated the power to promulgate 'guidelines. The
question was whether it could.' 28 As with the institutional critique
of Younger, the question was whether notions of separation of pow-
ers barred the courts from performing the activity. If courts cannot
do so, then a statute purportedly authorizing it must either be con-
strued not to authorize it or be struck down. The same considera-
tions relate to any claim that the Constitution is the source of
121. IME at 393.
122. I& at 388, 391.
123. Id. at 392-93.
124. Id. at 396.
125. In at 413 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 396.
127. Id. -at 393-94 & n.20. Summing up, the Court stated that "since substantive
judgment in the field of sentencing has been and remains appropriate to the Judicial
Branch, and the methodology of rulemaking has been and remains appropriate to that
Branch, Congress' considered decision to combine these functions in an independent
Sentencing Commission and to locate that Commission within the Judicial Branch does
not violate the principle of separation of powers." IE at 396-97.
128. There was also the dassic delegation question of whether Congress had laid
down an intelligible standard. Id. at 371-79.
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judicial authority, such as the argument that Article III's grant of the
"judicial power" authorizes Younger. Of course an exercise of power
authorized by Article III cannot violate the Constitution.' 29 The
point is that if an assertion of judicial power was totally at variance
with the underlying scheme of separation of powers, the Court
would find it outside of Article III.
It thus becomes relevant to ask whether the jurisdictional law that
Younger represents is so clearly within the Article I legislative domain
that an Article III court cannot fashion it. One might begin with
Chadha's definition of legislation subject to Article I as "action that
[has] the purpose and effect of altering the legal rights, duties, and
relations of persons ...outside the Legislative Branch."' 30 This
definition is not watertight. Much adjudication by common law
courts has the same effect, but the relevant point is that what the
courts do in Younger cases does not meet this definition. Abstention
by one forum from adjudicating rights in favor of an equally compe-
tent forum does not alter such rights. It does not "regulate ...
primary conduct" as that term is used in Mistretta. 13 1 The reference
to primary conduct reflects notions of social contract that laws that
bind one person to another can only come from the elected
legislature.13
2
On closer examination, however, doctrines of access to courts are
closer to the core legislative function than these initial observations
indicate. To begin with, they are forms of power allocation within
the federal system. The power in question is that of resolving dis-
putes. Under the constitutional scheme such allocational questions
are either resolved by the Constitution itself or assigned to Con-
gress. Congress may exercise it by inaction, thus leaving a matter in
the hands of the states, or by acting to federalize the matter in whole
or in part. The point is that power allocation decisions are so funda-
mental that only Congress can make them.133
Moreover, one should not be too quick to separate questions of
rights from questions of access to a particular set of courts to en-
force those rights. Access doctrines can affect rights by disfavoring
their enforcement.134 Younger may be shielded from this criticism by
the presence of some inquiry by the federal court into whether the
129. Cf Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 678-79 (1988) (stating that because the
judges' power to appoint an independent counsel is derived from the Constitution, it
cannot violate the Constitution).
130. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952 (1983).
131. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 396.
132. Obviously the phenomenon of common law adjudication runs counter to these
notions. At the federal level, analysts have devoted considerable attention to the legiti-
macy ofjudge-made law. See, e.g., Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U.
Cm. L. REv. 1, 46-47 (1985).
133. Of course, the courts make power allocation decisions through interpretation,
but these decisions are not presented as policy choices.
134. See Levit, supra note 4, at 363 (stating that "curtailment of federal jurisdiction
works against the disadvantaged and powerless classes"); Wells, Is Disparity a Problem?,
22 GA. L. Rv. 283 (1988).
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alternative forum is adequate.1 3 5 In the context of section 1983,
however, the ability to enforce a federal right in federal court is it-
self a right-one which the rightholder may regard as of great value,
and one which only Congress can create.13 6 Abstention takes this
right away.
Stated in this fashion the institutional separation of powers cri-
tique has force. Still, the major theme of the recent cases is a system
of shared powers with a good deal of interaction over a range of
matters. In Mistretta the Court alluded to "a 'twilight area' in which
the activities of the separate Branches merge."' 3 7 If sentencing
guidelines which must be followed are part of that area, it may well
be that rules about declining to exercise granted jurisdiction are as
well. Congress and the judiciary share responsibility for the issue.
The courts have an important contribution to make; one which Con-
gress may want factored into the equation.' 38 If Congress dis-
agrees, it retains the final say. Putting aside whether Congress has
spoken, the fact of judicial action does not by itself seem either an
undue incursion or an undue aggrandizement.
There is one additional aspect of the recent cases that may be rel-
evant to the separation of powers critique of Younger. The lesson of
the cases is that in any conflict over power allocation the Court wil
show great deference to Congress's position. One might state this
simply in terms of the results: the cases favor innovative govern-
mental approaches and these approaches will generally come from
Congress. The change in result, however, reflects a change in atti-
tude toward the balance of power among the branches. In Chadha
and Bowsher the Court saw the accretion of power in Congress as a
danger. In Chadha, for example, ChiefJustice Burger invoked "the
profound conviction of the Framers that the powers conferred on
Congress were the powers to be most carefully circumscribed."'
13 9
It was Justice White, dissenting in Chadha, who invoked the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause to argue the contrary position that Congress
should possess great leeway when acting in its domain. 140
The position of Justice White dominates the "flexible cases."
135. E.g., Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 337 & n.14 (1977) (discussing federal plain-
tiff's opportunity to present federal claims). It should be noted, however, that the Court
has moved toward a strong presumption that state procedures are adequate. See Alt-
house, supra note 49, at 1063-65.
136. There is, of course, the possibility that the Court would have reached the section
1983 result through Bivens-style federal common law. See Wells, supra note 80, at 1102-
03; supra note 75.
137. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 386 (1989).
138. Cf idL at 408 ("As part of ... reciprocity and as part of the integration of dis-
persed powers into a workable government, Congress may enlist the assistance ofjudges
in the creation of rules to govern the Judicial Branch.").
139. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 947 (1983).
140. Id at 983-84 (White, J., dissenting).
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They are replete with references to Congress's familiarity with the
problem at hand and indications that the Court must defer to its
choice of solution.14' The reason for abandoning formalistic sepa-
ration of powers analysis is that it might "unduly constrict Congress'
ability to take needed and innovative action pursuant to its Article I
powers."' 142 Indeed, deference may not stop there. The Court has
suggested that an overriding need for Congress to promote objec-
tives within its authority can trump otherwise applicable separation
of powers constraints. Thus, in Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural
Products Co. 143 the Court stated that "the requirements of [Article]
III must in proper circumstances give way to accommodate plenary
grants of power to Congress to legislate with respect to specialized
areas." 144 If Congress is the body that decides what circumstances
are proper, flexible separation of powers is a paper tiger. Even
short of viewing the controversies as nonjusticiable, the law of sepa-
ration of powers looks like the law of deference. It may represent a
natural evolution in the views of a majoritarian Court.
This development might be seen as support for the institutional
separation of powers critique of Younger. Deferential analysis exalts
the role of Congress with respect to the other branches. As far as
federal court jurisdiction is concerned, however, a partial response
is that we already knew that Congress is dominant. It alone has the
power to confer jurisdiction. Equally important is the fact that the
deferential analyses are all triggered by congressional action that
may conflict with the authority of another branch. The recent sepa-
ration cases' emphasis on deference does not lend much support for
the institutional critique that the Court cannot formulate jurisdic-
tional policy. Its relevance, if any, is to the textual critique that Con-
gress has foreclosed this formulation.
Indeed, taken as a whole, the thrust of the recent separation of
powers cases is to undermine seriously the institutional critique.
Notions of shared power and flexibility support the kind ofjurisdic-
tional policymaking that Younger represents. Thus, the cases most
relevant to the separation of powers critique do not support it in
what seemed its strongest form: the institutional formulation. If the
critique is "seemingly irrefutable,"' 145 that conclusion must stand or
fall on the text of the relevant statutes. Before turning to the textual
critique it will be helpful to consider two other bodies of relevant
case law: state sovereignty and the limited nature of federal jurisdic-
tion. These cases shed light on, respectively, relationships between
separation of powers and federalism and the roles of the Court and
Congress in matters of federal jurisdiction. They provide more sup-
port for the separation critique than do the separation cases.
141. E.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 845-46
(1986).
142. Id. at 851.
143. 473 U.S. 568 (1985).
144. Id. at 590-91 (citing Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 407-08 (1973)).
145. Redish, supra note 16, at 77-78.
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III. Burger-Rehnquist Court Federalism and the Limited Nature of
FederalJurisdiction
A. Federalism
The link between Younger abstention and other federalism issues
has been noted frequently. 146 An important example is the substan-
tive federalism of National League of Cities v. Usery. 147 In that case the
Court held that in areas of traditional state sovereignty the Constitu-
tion limits the federal government's power to regulate "the States as
States." 148 National League of Cities might be read either as establish-
ing zones of state autonomy149 or as utilizing a balancing test'50 to
determine when federal regulation prevails. Nine years later the
Court rejected both approaches and overruled National League of Cit-
ies in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority. 151 Garcia rests
on the notion that the primary protections of state sovereignty are
to be found in the Constitution's limited grants of power to the na-
tional government and in the national political process. 152 It is not
the role of the judiciary to identify and protect areas of state
autonomy.15
3
One might argue that the abandonment of National League of Cities
presages the abandonment of Younger. The two cases were seen as
closely related.IM4 Each represents an effort to harmonize state and
national interests by preventing national institutions from riding
roughshod over the states' interests. Each represents a judicially-
formulated doctrine to protect those interests. Indeed, in National
League of Cities the Court seems to equate the states with a coordinate
branch of the national government.' 55 Ultimately the Court has
backed down in apparent recognition of Congress's predominant
role within the branches and between the levels when it comes to
charting the contours of the federal system. In particular, Garcia
casts grave doubt on the legitimacy of any judicial role in allocating
power within the federal system or in protecting state institutions
146. E.g., Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The New Federalism and Affirma-
tive Rights to Essential Government Services, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1065, 1099-1100 (1977).
147. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled, Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Authority,
469 U.S. 528 (1985).
148. Ia at 845.
149. See id at 852 (referring to states' "freedom to structure integral operations in
areas of traditional governmental functions").
150. See id at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (noting that the Court seems to adopt a
balancing approach).
151. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
152. Id at 547-54.
153. Id at 552.
154. Tribe, supra note 146, at 1099-1100.
155. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 849 (noting that a state is "a coordinate
element in the system established by the Framers for governing our Federal Union"),
overrue4 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
IQQnl
from national power.15 6
There are, however, two crucial distinctions between this context
and Younger. In Garcia there was no doubt about the congressional
command. Congress had foreclosed the operation of state institu-
tional choices over how much to pay specified employees. More-
over, the Court was engaged in substantive constitutional
interpretation in resolving the question of possible limits on Con-
gress's ability to do so. Younger represents a judge-made law of fed-
eral-state judicial relations. Garcia sheds little if any light on the
institutional legitimacy of this exercise. Younger represents neither
an attempt to limit Congress nor the kind of constitutional adjudica-
tion which Garcia renounced. To say that Congress is supreme
points, once again, only to the statutory texts.
B. Limited Federal Jurisdiction
There remain for consideration a number of cases in which the
Court has considered judicial power over federal jurisdiction. This
body of law includes many of the numerous decisions in which the
Burger-Rehnquist Court has developed a restrictive approach to
federal jurisdiction. Although some critics may view federalism as
the driving force behind this approach,1 57 the doctrine of separation
of powers plays an equal role.158 Indeed, it is a major theme of the
recent jurisdiction cases, as are the related notions of limited federal
jurisdiction and deference to Congress as its allocator. The cases
are highly relevant to the separation of powers critique of Younger in
part for these reasons and in part because they come from the same
wing of the Court as do the extensions of Younger. '5 9 Several as-
pects of the jurisdiction cases support the separation of powers cri-
tique to a far greater extent than the separation of powers cases
themselves.
The notion of the limited nature of federal jurisdiction extends
beyond cases that deal only with jurisdiction. It can be found as well
in discussion of such matters as federal common law,' 60 implied
rights of action,' 6 ' and the availability of Bivens damages remedies
for violation of constitutional rights by federal officials.1 62 The com-
mon theme is the limited nature of the federal judicial business and
the Court's reluctance or lack of power to extend the judicial reach.
The notion of limited authority furthers separation of powers values
in emphasizing Congress's control over the operation of the federal
courts and its role as the maker of law. It also furthers federalism
156. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 552, 556-57.
157. E.g., Amar, supra note 9, at 1425-26.
158. See, e.g., Brown, Of Activism and Erie-The Implication Doctrine's Implications for the
Nature and Role of the Federal Courts, 69 IowA L. REv. 617, 630-31, 636 (1984).
159. Redish, supra note 16, at 82 n.20, 83-84.
160. E.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 717-18 (1979) (Rehnquist,
J., concurring).
161. Id at 746 (Powell, J., dissenting).
162. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 37-44 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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values in emphasizing the states' role in the national legislative pro-
cess, as opposed to the federal judiciary, and the supposedly limited
nature of all federal power. 1
63
The cases deal with a wide range of issues and can be divided into
a number of groups, of which two will be considered here. The first
involves the interrelated issues of federal common law, implied
rights of action, and Bivens remedies. Here the Court takes the posi-
tion that a particular enlargement of the federal role is not beyond
Article III, and that the judiciary might possess power to effectuate
it, but that separation concerns counsel "hesitation" until Congress
has given an authorization to go ahead. 64 Federal common law is a
good example. Although the Court demonstrates ambivalence,
165
its general approach is not to encourage the judicial fashioning of
federal law. In City of Milwaukee v. Illinois 166 Justice Rehnquist cited
Erie'67 for the proposition that "[flederal courts, unlike state courts,
are not general common-law courts and do not possess a general
power to develop and apply their own rules of decision."' 168 His
opinion illustrates how Erie concerns can be stated in terms of sepa-
ration of powers as well as federalism. Congress not only possesses
democratic legitimacy; it is the body in the best position "to develop
national policy in areas governed by federal common law."' 169
This analysis is highly relevant to the institutional critique of
Younger. It reinforces the notion of Congress as primary lawmaker.
More importantly, it casts doubt upon the legitimacy of federal com-
mon law unless circumstances are such that federal courts are "com-
pelled" to formulate it.170 To the extent that Younger is seen as
federal common law this exacting test may not be met. City of Mil-
waukee can be read to support both the institutional and text-based
critiques. Congress had addressed the problem of environmental
law that was before the Court. For Justice Rehnquist that meant
163. Whether national power is in fact limited very much, given expansive readings
of Article I powers is a debatable question. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 587-88 (1988) (O'ConnorJ., dissenting) (discussing the "unprece-
dented growth of federal regulatory activity").
164. The phrase is taken from Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bu-
reau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), where the Court referred to the possibility of
"special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress."
Id at 396. It is, however, applicable to the Court's general approach to the broad area
discussed here.
165. See Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504-06 (1988) (creating
federal common law with regard to government contractors).
166. 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
167. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
168. City of Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 312 (citing Erie, 304 U.S. at 78).
169. Id at 313. The quote is to the effect that courts are not better suited in the
environmental area than they are in others, but the clear implication is that Congress is
the body to make national policy in all areas.
170. itL at 314.
I oQrn]
that the federal courts should stay out, not as a matter of the will of
Congress, but out of preference for legislative solutions. 171 Quot-
ing in part from Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill 172 he emphasized
that the question was not one of prohibition of federal common law
but of the role of statutes that speak "directly"' 173 to a problem:
"[o]ur 'commitment to the separation of powers is too fundamental'
to continue to rely on federal common law 'by judicially decreeing
what accords with "common sense and the public weal"' when Con-
gress has addressed the problem."' 74 One could apply much the
same analysis to a matter which Congress has addressed through
section 1983 and the jurisdictional statutes.' 75 The existence of rel-
evant legislative texts forecloses judicial action along the lines of
Younger.
The Court's recent cases on implied rights of action also
strengthen the separation of powers critique of Younger. The issue
arises when a federal statute imposes a duty but does not provide
for any private enforcement of it. A private plaintiff who seeks judi-
cial recourse to redress a violation of that duty asks the court to
imply from the statute a private right to sue to enforce it. The
Supreme Court's recent trend has been to decline to find private
rights of action.176 It sometimes has reached this result as a matter
of statutory construction, using analyses that suggest that it might
find a private right but that plaintiffs face an uphill burden.' 77 Per-
haps the same strict approach to statutory construction argues
against finding authority to formulate abstention doctrine.1 78
For several Justices the implied right cases also present funda-
mental issues of separation of powers. The major statement of this
view is Justice Powell's dissent in Cannon v. University of Chicago, 17 9 a
dissent that may now reflect the prevailing law.' 8 0 He saw the impli-
cation of a right of action as opening the door to a case that other-
wise could not have been brought in federal court. For the Court to
do so would invade Congress's power over jurisdiction.181 More-
over, the formulation of a remedial scheme represents "policymak-
ing authority vested by the Constitution in the Legislative
171. See id. at 314-15.
172. 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978).
173. City of Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 315.
174. Id (quoting Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 195).
175. See Redish, supra note 16, at 83-84. Professor Redish notes the irony that then-
Justice Rehnquist was the author of City of Milwaukee and is a "staunch advocate ofjudge-
made abstention." Id. at 83.
176. E.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174 (1988).
177. In Thompson the Court indicated considerable reluctance to imply a right of ac-
tion, but stated that it would not utilize an analysis that would make the doctrine a "dead
letter." Id. at 179.
178. See Redish, supra note 16, at 78 n.42.
179. 441 U.S. 677, 730 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
180. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 25 (1979) (Powell,J.,
concurring).
181. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 730-31 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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Branch."'182 The Court should neither make these choices for Con-
gress nor should it upset the choices made. The refusal to imply a
remedy can be seen as another example of refusal to make federal
common law. Likewise, the Court's implication analysis supports
the separation of powers critique in both its forms. The analysis
employs the general theme of institutional deference in matters of
the business of the federal courts. It also emphasizes the specific
point of leaving intact the degree of enforcement structured by
Congress in complex statutory schemes. As Professor Redish points
out with respect to jurisdictional statutes, "[w]hile judicial creation
of private rights of action can undermine a carefully structured stat-
utory goal only indirectly, judicial lawmaking through abstention
can very directly undermine that goal."'183
The presence of congressional action also plays an important role
in another set of cases that belong in this group: those in which the
Court denies a Bivens damages remedy for violations of constitu-
tional rights by federal officials.'8 No statute authorizes these rem-
edies-there is no federal counterpart to the generalized right to
sue which section 1983 provides against state and local officials.
Nonetheless, in Bivens the Court held it within the judiciary's inher-
ent authority to award damages against federal officials for a Fourth
Amendment violation.' 85 The Court viewed this award as a natural
consequence of the fact that it had jurisdiction and an established
authority to award equitable relief.186 The Court stated, however,
that it might decline to award damages if Congress had directly pre-
cluded this relief or if there were any "special factors counselling
hesitation." 8 7
Recent cases have focused on this latter exception in denying Biv-
ens remedies.' 88 It is congressional action that is the special factor.
As in the federal common law area, however, it is not specific dis-
placement of the courts, but the establishment of a remedial scheme
by Congress that might give the plaintiff some relief.189 In the mili-
tary context it may be that Congress's special competence and ex-
pertise are enough by themselves, 90 but the general pattern is to
note legislative competence whatever the area and the manifestation
of congressional concern through the provision of some remedy. As
182. Id. at 743.
183. Redish, supra note 16, at 114-15.
184. E.g., Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 390 (1983).
185. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 391-97 (1971).
186. Id. at 396.
187. Id
188. E.g., Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 421-23 (1988).
189. See Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 385-86 (1983).
190. See United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 679 (1987).
l9901
the Court said in Schweiker v. Chilicky, 191 "[w]hen the design of a
Government program suggests that Congress has provided what it
considers adequate remedial mechanisms for constitutional viola-
tions that may occur in the course of its administration, we have not
created additional Bivens remedies."' 192 It is important to note that
deference extends to the exact measure of relief Congress has pro-
vided, including no relief at all for constitutional violations, at least
if Congress's inaction may "not [have] been inadvertent."' 193
The Court's attitude toward Congress resembles its attitude in the
federal common law and implied right cases, but is even more strik-
ing given the fact that the Court continues to maintain that judicial
power to grant the remedy exists,' 94 and that the decision among
remedies seems to be a core judicial function.' 95 Moreover, what is
involved is remedies for constitutional violations; an area in which
the judiciary has a special role and expertise. 196 Again, the textual
separation critique in particular derives force. The existence of a
statute forecloses judicial action. However, none of the cases con-
sidered thus far involves direct construction of a statute as telling
the courts not to act.
In this respect, a second group of jurisdiction cases may be rele-
vant: those in which the Court has denied access to a federal court
based on construction of a jurisdictional statute. In Owen Equipment
& Erection Co. v. Kroger 197 the Court refused to let a diversity plaintiff
assert a complaint against a third-party defendant from the same
state. Concepts of ancillary and pendent jurisdiction developed in
cases such as United Mine Workers v. Gibbs 198 might have permitted
this action,' 99 but the Court found in the diversity statute a "basic
rule" of complete diversity.200 Allowing the plaintiff to take advan-
tage of the defendant's third-party complaint would circumvent this
rule and thus frustrate Congress's policy. The Court reasoned that
as a general matter, "[i]t is a fundamental precept that federal
courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. The limits upon federal ju-
risdiction, whether imposed by the Constitution or by Congress,
must be neither disregarded nor evaded."'20
1
A somewhat similar issue arose in Aldinger v. Howard, 2 02 in which
the plaintiff sought to assert pendent party jurisdiction against an
entity the plaintiff could not have sued directly under the main fed-
eral claim. That entity was a county that at the time was beyond the
191. 487 U.S. 412 (1988).
192. Id. at 423.
193. Id.
194. See Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 374 (1983).
195. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 405-06 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
196. See Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 443 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
197. 437 U.S. 365 (1978).
198. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
199. Kroger, 437 U.S. at 371 n.10.
200. Id. at 377.
201. Id. at 374.
202. 427 U.S. 1 (1976).
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reach of section 1983.203 Thus the plaintiff could not assert federal
question or civil rights jurisdiction against it, and there was no di-
versity. The Court described the attempt to bring the county in on a
state claim pendent to the main federal claim against a different de-
fendant as an invitation to the federal courts "to fashion ajurisdic-
tional doctrine under the general language of Art. III enabling them
to circumvent [the] exclusion, as long as the civil rights action and
the state-law claim arise from a 'common nucleus of operative
fact.' "204 The Court declared that a "fair reading" of the two stat-
utes argued against jurisdiction in light of the congressional pur-
pose to exclude counties from section 1983 suits.
20 5
The 1989 decision in Finley v. United States206 casts doubt on the
general validity of pendent-party jurisdiction. The plaintiff had
brought suit against the United States under the Federal Tort
Claims Act.20 7 The Court refused to allow her to join as defendants
nonfederal parties who were citizens of her state. The majority did
not rely on any congressional intent to exclude them, but on the fact
that "no independent basis of jurisdiction exist[ed]. ' 208 Aldinger
was read as establishing a general proposition: "that the Gibbs ap-
proach would not be extended to the pendent-party field." 20 9 The
Court seemed to say that parties, as opposed to claims, cannot be
brought before a federal court unless Congress has explicitly au-
thorized it.21° This reasoning rules but any notion of pendent par-
ties, at least if the definition of pendent resembles "closely related
to the original case, but not part of that case as Congress defined it."
Owen, Aldinger, and Finley are significant in that they arose in an
area where judicial creativity in matters of jurisdiction has been
noteworthy: pendent and ancillary jurisdiction. They show that ju-
risdictional statutes and the policies embodied in those statutes can
block the formulation and utilization ofjudge-made doctrines about
jurisdiction. As such, these cases support the separation of powers
critique at least in its textual form. Of course, the denials of juris-
diction at issue in the last group of cases discussed further the policy
of limitedness. The quote from Kroger reminds us.that this policy is
203. Id. at 17. But see Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 663-65,
690 (1978) (reversing prior law and holding that political subdivisions are "persons"
that can be sued under section 1983).
204. Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 16 (quoting United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715,
725 (1966)).
205. Id at 17.
206. 109 S. Ct. 2003 (1989).
207. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (1988).
208. Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2008.
209. Id at 2010.
210. Id (stating as a rule "that a grant ofjurisdiction over claims involving particular
parties does not itself confer jurisdiction over additional claims by or against different
parties").
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fundamental and that its origins are found both in statutes and in
the Constitution itself.
Younger abstention certainly does not violate the policy of limited
federal court jurisdiction. To that extent, the cases discussed in this
subpart can be distinguished from Younger. (This should not be read
as stating the perverse argument that Younger furthers limitedness
by ousting plaintiffs from federal court.) One way to read the cases
is that they stand for the proposition that expansion of federal juris-
diction must come, if permissible at all, from Congress. The em-
phasis is on Congress's role as the conferrer of jurisdiction rather
than on any role as exclusive measurer of exact degree. The juris-
dictional cases, however, do emphasize the importance of what Con-
gress has said. Their primary relevance to this Article is as support
for the text-based critique. Analysis now turns to that question.
IV. Congressional Text and Judicial Duty
One can find numerous statements by the Court and by individual
justices that the federal courts are under a "duty" to exercise any
jurisdiction that Congress has vested in them.21' In its strongest
form, the language indicates that this duty derives from the Consti-
tution.2 12 If so, that would be the end of Younger and any other form
of abstention. A federal court with jurisdiction would have to exer-
cise it. While duty there may be, however, it is hard to see how it
comes from the Constitution. That document does not confer juris-
diction on the lower federal courts. Congress has the power to cre-
ate them, or not, and to allocate their jurisdiction.21 3 Unless one
reads the Constitution as mandating that Congress vest all jurisdic-
tion, that body must have power to decide how much jurisdiction
the lower courts have and whether they are under any duty to exer-
cise it.
For purposes of Younger abstention three statutes are directly rele-
vant. Section 1331 of title 28 provides that "[t]he district courts
shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 214 Section
1343 of title 28 provides, in part, that they "shall have original juris-
diction of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any
person" to redress deprivation under color of state law of federal
constitutional rights and some statutory rights. 21 5 Neither statute
contains a jurisdictional amount. 21 6 Section 1983 of title 42 states
211. E.g., England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 415
(1964) (quoting Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19, 40 (1909)); Kline v.
Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 234 (1922).
212. E.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821); see Levit, supra note
4, at 362 (federal courts have "a constitutional obligation to exercise jurisdiction").
213. See C. WRIGrr, supra note 2, at 32-39.
214. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988).
215. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) (1988).
216. The civil rights jurisdiction section has never contained ajurisdictional amount.
The $10,000 minimum in federal question cases was abolished in 1980. Federal Ques-
tion Jurisdictional Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-486, 94 Stat. 2369; see C.
WRIGrr, supra note 2, at 123-24.
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that any person who, acting under color of state law, deprives any
person of federal constitutional or statutory rights "shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
'217
The statutes do not in express terms speak to Younger abstention
or similar judicial action. That is neither surprising nor dispositive.
They are broad-based, general jurisdictional and remedial grants
declining with matters of inclusion not exclusion. The notion that
they forbid Younger might be restated in any of five different ways.
The jurisdictional statutes can be read to impose a duty, through the
word "shall," to hear all the cases they cover.218 The statutes to-
gether can be read as creating a set of federal remedies for federal
rights and assuring the availability of a federal forum to vindicate
them.219 The remedial choice is directly bound up with the reme-
dies and rights. Indeed, the ability to choose a federal forum can be
viewed as a right in and of itself.220 Alternatively, one can argue
that taken together with other sections of the judicial code, the stat-
utes are part of a complex legislative scheme in which Congress has
addressed the question of when federal courts should not take juris-
diction as well as when they should.221 Finally, drawing on the fed-
eral common law cases, it may be enough that they exist.
222
Without for now distinguishing among these possible readings let
us consider two opposing views of how to approach the statutory
framework: literalist and nonliteralist. For Professor Redish the
statutes mean what they say. Fairly read, they forbid Younger be-
cause "[t]he language of the relevant statutes leaves no room for
judicial limitation or modification. ' 223 The emphasis here is not
only on the text and the use of "shall"; 224 historical context and
legislative purpose are important as well. Congress created the sec-
tion 1983 remedy and established the civil rights and general fed-
eral question jurisdiction of the district courts in part out of distrust
of state courts as enforcers of federal rights. 225 In this respect it is
important to recognize that section 1983 makes federal rights a
217. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
218. See Redish, supra note 16, at 112-13 & n.185.
219. See id. at 115 (stating that the power to make substantive policy includes the
power to ensure the availability of a federal forum).
220. See Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 125 (1981)
(Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting England v. Louisiana State Bd. of
Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411,415 (1964) and Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212
U.S. 19, 40) (1909)).
221. See Redish, supra note 16, at 81.
222. Proponents of the separation of powers critique generally advocate one of the
first four readings.
223. Redish, supra note 16, at 84.
224. Id. at 112 n.185.
225. Id. at 73 n.15; see also Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804,
1A0Ql
sword in the hands of plaintiffs. Younger abstention remits them to
state proceedings in which they are generally defendants and can
assert those rights only as a shield.
Those who disagree with Professor Redish have advanced a
number of alternative nonliteralist approaches. Perhaps the most
radical is that of Professor Wells who asserts that statutory issues are
largely irrelevant.226 He views abstention as "a judge-made forum
rule for a judge-made cause of action." 227 His thesis is that the
Court developed the generalized section 1983 remedy-as opposed
to actions which further the statute's purpose of protecting the civil
rights of newly freed blacks-outside of the statutory context, much
as it developed Bivens remedies. 228 There are certainly similarities
between section 1983 and Bivens, 229 although the Bivens dissenters
suggested that the existence of a statute authorizing damage actions
against state officials removed any separation of powers obstacles
that faced actions against federal officials. 230 Moreover, Professor
Wells makes a helpful point in putting a federal common law gloss
on much of what has been done under section 1983231 as well as on
Younger and other abstention doctrines. Still, the Court treats its
major section 1983 cases as problems in statutory construction.23 2
The very breadth of the statute makes extremely difficult Professor
Wells's assertion that "Congress has never enacted a statute grant-
ing a general right to recover damages or injunctive relief from state
officers or governments for constitutional violations. '233 Section
1983 certainly looks like one.
An alternative response to Professor Redish's strict reading of the
statutes is to view them as important, even central, but not as pro-
viding definitive answers or as constituting the only source to which
one must look to resolve questions of abstention and similar mat-
ters. Professor Shapiro and others present the statutes as "organic"
laws234_-"open textured" 23 -5 parameters within which the courts op-
erate. Moreover, it makes sense under this view to consider Con-
gress as having enacted them against a background of traditions and
827 n.6 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that Congress conferred federal ques-
tion jurisdiction because of "its belief that state courts are hostile to assertions of federal
rights").
226. Wells, supra note 80, at 1098.
227. Id.
228. Id- at 1102-03.
229. See Brown, Letting Statutory Dogs Wag Constitutional Tails-Have the Bivens Dissenters
Prevailed?, 64 IND. L.J. 263, 263-66 (1989).
230. E.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 427-28 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting). The views of the Bivens dissenters are
particularly important in that the current Court takes a similar position. See Brown, supra
note 229, at 264, 274-78.
231. Wells, supra note 80, at 1101-07.
232. E.g., Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).
233. Wells, supra note 80, at 1132.
234. Shapiro, supra note 80, at 574.
235. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV.
605, 622 n.49 (1981).
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understandings about how courts operate.23 6 Professor Shapiro ar-
gues for the existence of a significant tradition of judicial discretion
over jurisdictional matters in both law and equity. For him "the
question whether a court must exercise jurisdiction and resolve a
controversy on its merits is difficult, if not impossible, to answer in
gross."
2 3 7
There is textual support for this flexible view. Section 1983 does
say a violator of rights "shall be liable," but the plaintiff's recourse
is proceedings in "law," or "equity," 238 seemingly incorporating
whatever discretion inheres in those systems. Similarly, the jurisdic-
tional statutes say that the district courts "shall have... jurisdic-
tion, 23 9 but if the emphasis is placed on 'jurisdiction," rather than
"shall," the question again arises whether that is not a term incorp-
orating some content of discretion. Moreover, the jurisdictional
statutes relate to the fundamental Article III grant of "judicial
power" which courts having jurisdiction possess. There is surely
room in this concept for some discretion over jurisdiction and re-
lated matters. In the face of these textual arguments Professor Red-
ish is unmoved. He dismisses them as "puzzling and vague, ' 240 and
insists on a straightforward, literal reading. In support of his posi-
tion one might ask whether sound principles of draftsmanship re-
quire Congress to write statutes that say something like "the district
courts shall have original jurisdiction, they shall exercise it, and we
mean it."
Still, there is some room for disagreement over the text-based cri-
tique of Younger. In part the matter depends on the separation of
powers philosophy with which one approaches the matter. An advo-
cate of strict, compartmentalized separation of powers might ak
whether the statutes delegate discretionary authority to abstain out of
concerns of comity and federalism. Posed this way, the question
does not easily yield an affirmative answer given the mandatory lan-
guage and the relevant historical context. The statutes can be said
to confer jurisdiction with sufficient force that they create a strong
presumption against declining to exercise it.241 On the other hand,
consider the bearing of the flexible doctrine of separation of powers
236. See Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity,
98 YALE LJ. 1, 114 (1988) (noting that general jurisdictional statutes are enacted
"against a background understanding of sovereign immunity"). Professor Jackson's
Eleventh Amendment analysis is extremely helpful in the Younger context as well.
237. Shapiro, supra note 80, at 574. Under this view, the development of federal ju-
risdictional policy is a form of dialogue between Congress and the Court. See Fallon, The
Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REv. 1141, 1248-50 (1988); infa note 267.
238. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
239. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332 (1988).
240. Redish, supra note 16, at 84.
241. The notion of such a presumption is an important element of Professor Redish's
analysis. See id at 78-79.
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that has dominated the Court's recent decisions in this area. This
approach emphasizes shared functions, with cooperation and inter-
action between the branches as the norm, while Congress is the
dominant authority. From this perspective one might phrase the
question as whether the statutes withdraw or prohibit the exercise of au-
thority that the courts would normally derive from such concepts as
"law and equity," the "judicial power," and "jurisdiction." Viewed
this way the statutes do leave room to maneuver. It is also impor-
tant that Congress retains the final say and can abolish Younger. The
point is not a contention that Congress somehow ratifies abstention
through its silence on the matter,242 but that the scheme established
preserves both the goals of shared responsibility and ultimate con-
gressional power.
The text-based critique has another serious weakness: it seems to
rule out all abstention including Younger itself. Justice Douglas may
have taken this position when he dissented in Younger,243 but Justice
Brennan concurred. 244 Justice Brennan's opinions on the subject
advance the view that Younger is legitimate only as a narrow equita-
ble exception to the district courts' general duty to take section
1983 cases. 245 But if the statutes impose such a duty it is hard to see
how Younger is correct. If Younger is correct, its extensions, at least in
the equitable context, cannot be attacked as violations of separation
of powers. They may be bad equity, the utilization of improper val-
ues, or an incorrect weighing, but that does not make them illegiti-
mate. In other words, the debate over Younger becomes like the
debate over other recent Burger-Rehnquist Court restrictive juris-
dictional doctrines: the questions are matters of policy, rather than
matters of authority or lack of it.
It is worth noting that the same ambiguity pervades Justice Bren-
nan's approach to other issues of abstention. In Colorado River Water
Conservation District v. United States 24 6 the issue was whether a federal
district court should dismiss a water rights case in deference to
pending state litigation over the same matter. The Supreme Court,
in an opinion by Justice Brennan, upheld the dismissal. He first ana-
lyzed the question as one of possible abstention. He posited a "vir-
tually unflagging obligation of the federal courts to exercise the
jurisdiction given them." 247 Still, abstention is permitted as an "ex-
traordinary and narrow exception to [this] duty. '248 He identified
three forms of permissible abstention, none of which applied to the
Colorado River facts.249 Justice Brennan's acceptance of judicial au-
thority to evade the jurisdictional duty did not stop there, however.
242. See id. at 82-83 (rejecting the ratification rationale).
243. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 65 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
244. Ma at 56 (Brennan, J., concurring).
245. See, e.g., Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 454 (1977) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
246. 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
247. MaL at 817.
248. Ido at 813 (quoting Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188 (1959)).
249. The opinion discusses the following forms of abstention: Pullman abstention,
which sends litigants to state court to resolve a state law issue which might obviate the
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He posited a further, limited ability to decline to hear a case when
parallel state proceedings are pending "for reasons of wise judicial
administration." 250 Despite his disclaimer, Colorado River dismissals
look a lot like Younger dismissals and certainly further some of the
same federalism goals. It is true that the Court has sharply re-
stricted Colorado River abstention.2 51 The point is that Justice Bren-
nan's acceptance ofjudicial power to formulate doctrines about not
exercising jurisdiction, in a case in which his premise was the duty
of federal courts to adjudicate, is totally at variance with the text-
based separation of powers critique. That critique seemingly leaves
no room for abstention, a point Professor Redish is ready to
accept.2 52
It is tempting to conclude that not much is left of the text-based
critique if it runs counter to current notions of separation of powers,
requires the abandonment of all abstention, and is undercut by the
general position of its strongest proponent. The Court, including
Justice Brennan, however, might be wrong. Perhaps we have an-
other Erie situation where the Court persists in statutory error until
overwhelming evidence compels it to change its ways.253 As noted,
the duty proposition can be stated in several ways. Most of these
can be reformulated as saying that the district courts should do what
they normally do, including taking into consideration the role of
state courts where appropriate. It is possible, however, that Con-
gress in establishing the statutory scheme considered a role for state
courts and rejected it. This argument is based in part on the history
of section 1983 and in part on Congress's longstanding and active
concern with judicial federalism embodied in the Anti-Injunction
Act.2 4 That statute parallels Younger in forbidding federal judicial
interference with state judicial proceedings. However, it exempts
need for a federal constitutional decision; abstention under cases such as Burford v. Sun
Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943), which permits dismissal of cases based on state law claims
involving matters of important state policy, especially where the state has established its
own review mechanism; and, Younger abstention.
250. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 818.
251. See Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 15
(1983). For a discussion of the rise and fll of Colorado River abstention, see infra notes
307-11 and accompanying text; see also Redish, supra note 16, at 97 (noting that Cone
"substantially curbed" this form of abstention).
252. See Redish, supra note 16, at 92-95 (discussing how rejection of Younger would
not seriously impair federalism values).
253. In Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), the Court overturned a
longstanding construction of the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652, which permit-
ted federal courts to fashion "general" common law. It relied in part on the historical
analysis of Professor Charles Warren. Erie, 304 U.S. at 72-73.
254. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1988). Section 2283 provides in full as follows: "A court of
the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except
as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction,
or to protect or effectuate its judgments."
1990]
from the prohibition injunctions "expressly authorized" by Con-
gress in another statute. In Mitchum v. Foster25 5 the Court held that
section 1983 is such an exception. 256 Thus it can be argued that the
general jurisdictional scheme of which section 1983 is a remedial
part considered the Younger option and rejected it.257 If so, the
Court would, as a matter of separation of powers, have to accept the
result.
Put this way, the text-based critique retains considerable force.
Two responses are possible. First, the relationship between Younger
and Mitchum is muddied at best.258 All the Justices who participated
in Mitchum insisted that it did not qualify the equity, comity, and
federalism approach that Younger had propounded one year ear-
lier.2 59 The best way to harmonize the two is that Mitchum leaves
intact the federal courts' authority to engage in federalistic absten-
tion even though Congress wants it to hear the equitable action as
an initial matter. A second point to note is that the seemingly abso-
lute language of section 1983 has not prevented the Court from
looking to common law tradition and methodology in developing a
wide range of immunity defenses in section 1983 actions.260 It is
true that this is a substantive defense, but its development resem-
bles the formulation ofjurisdictional law in Younger. In each context
the Court views itself as having authority to engage in traditional
judicial policymaking in formulating doctrines that weaken the sec-
tion 1983 absolute remedy. Indeed, the immunity cases are more
sweeping in that they ban or limit the plaintiff's claim in any court.
Younger, on the other hand, remits the plaintiff to another court with
the possibility of federal appellate review.
Finally there is the contention, based on the federal common law
cases (and perhaps on post-Bivens cases), that it is enough that Con-
gress has entered the field. Separation of powers concerns dictate
that the Court not add its own resolutions on top of what Congress
has devised. As noted, however, the role of the statutes is to trigger
questions of judicial authority, not to resolve them. Without juris-
diction the courts would not be involved at all in a case. The fact
that the judiciary has a strong claim to competence in the area may
answer arguments based on the refusal to formulate federal com-
mon law, although post-Bivens remedial cases cut against judicial ac-
tion. The main response to the statutory presence argument is that
it is incorrect to invoke statutes without considering their context
255. 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
256. Id at 243.
257. See Redish, supra note 16, at 89-90 (noting that the Anti-Injunction Act shows
Congress has limited federal judicial power "when it deemed such limitation[s] neces-
sary to protect federalism interests").
258. See id at 86-87.
259. Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 243; id. at 243-44 (Burger, C.J., concurring). It should be
noted that the two Justices who did not participate,Justice Rehnquist andJustice Powell,
were generally supportive of Younger.
260. See Brown, Municipal Liability Under Section 1983 and the Ambiguities of Burger Court
Federalism, 27 B.C.L. REV. 883, 886-88 (1986).
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and what they say. The statute in City of Milwaukee established liabil-
ity. The Court declined to formulate new ones. In the post-Bivens
cases the Court treats the relevant statutes as addressing the ques-
tion of remedy. The Court declines to add an additional one. Stat-
utes like section 1331 and section 1983 act broadly to set the
judiciary into motion. They do not necessarily address specific
questions of how it is to operate once underway.
In opting for this view of the statutes in question one can find
considerable support in the well-known line of decisions interpret-
ing section 1331's requirement that a case "arise under" the laws of
the United States in order to be within the original jurisdiction of a
federal district court.261 Congress may well have chosen this lan-
guage precisely to make federal jurisdiction as broad as possible.2 62
The Court, however, has insisted on not treating this statute as a
"wooden set of self-sufficient words. '263 The Court admits that the
statute is "broadly phrased," but describes its own actions in apply-
ing this language as a process of ongoing construction and limita-
tion "in the light of the history that produced it, the demands of
reason and coherence, and the dictates of sound judicial policy
which have emerged from the (judiciary] Act's function as a provi-
sion in the mosaic of federal judiciary legislation." 264 Not only does
the Court view section 1331 as giving it the authority to engage in
"management of the federal judicial system," 265 it utilizes that au-
thority to keep cases partially concerning federal issues out of a fed-
eral trial court based in part on consideration for the role of state
courts. 266 Apart from its resemblance to Younger abstention in
terms of the specific result reached, the Court's development of
"arising under" doctrine shows an understanding of the role ofju-
risdictional statutes that is closer to that of Professor Redish's critics
than to the mandatory reading which he advocates.267
261. Section 1331 provides that "[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988).
262. See, e.g., Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1,
8 n.8 (1983).
263. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 810 (1986) (quoting
Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 379 (1959)).
264. ML at 810.
265. ML at 808 (quoting Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 8).
266. In Merrell Dow, for example, the Court stated that "the presence of the federal
issue as an element of the state tort is not the kind of adjudication for which jurisdiction
would serve congressional purposes and thefederal system." Id. at 814 (emphasis added);
see also id at 808 (stating that "arising under" cases deal with "issues regarding the inter-
relation of federal and state authority"). There were, nonetheless, strong arguments for
placing in federal court a case that relied, in part, directly on the Food, Drug, and Cos-
metic Act as the source of the defendant's standard of conduct. See id. at 822-24, 827-28
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
267. The Court has also noted that Congress can step in to correct denials of section
1331 jurisdiction with which it disagrees. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers
1990]
What the text-based critique comes down to then is one set of
arguments on how to read these statutes. Like the institutional vari-
ant, it is not the ultimate weapon it seemed at first. The debate over
Younger cannot be cleansed of policy dimensions. Still, there are
signs that the Court is rethinking Younger, or at least restricting it,
and that the force behind this new approach is the notions of sepa-
ration of powers.
V Rethinking Younger-The Court'and the
Separation of Powers Critique
The juggernaut of Younger extension received a serious setback in
the 1989 case of New Orleans Public Service, Inc. (NOPSI) v. City Coun-
Cil. 268 The Council is the regulatory body with jurisdiction over
electric rates in New Orleans. It disallowed inclusion in the electric
company's rate base of substantial amounts related to the construc-
tion of a nuclear power plant. The company asserted that a decision
of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission concerning the
power plant constituted a federal law bar against the Council's ac-
tion. It filed actions to challenge the Council's order in state and
federal court. At issue before the Supreme Court in NOPSI was
whether the federal district court should have abstained.
The Supreme Court ruled unanimously that it should not have.
Justice Scalia's opinion, which reflected the views of seven members
of the Court, dealt primarily with the propriety of Younger absten-
tion.269 He noted at the outset that the mere fact of a pending state
proceeding of some sort did not trigger Younger.270 The key ques-
tion was whether the nature of the proceeding would make federal
judicial intervention a demonstration of "lack of respect for the
state as sovereign. '271 It thus became important to determine
which state proceeding the federal suit was challenging. Justice
Scalia analyzed the suit as aimed essentially at the Council's
order.27
2
He then examined whether the Council proceeding itself called
for Younger abstention. He concluded that it did not because it was
"legislative" rather than "judicial" in nature.273 He read the rele-
vant precedents as requiring abstention only in the latter context.
Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 22 (1983); see also Finley v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2003,
2010 (1989) (stating that Congress can overturn particular jurisdictional decisions and
that the Court's cases provide a background of interpretative rules). Thus the Court
seems to envision a process of, potentially, three stages. Congress passes jurisdictional
statutes which the Court then "interprets" in accordance with its own, judicially devel-
oped, set ofjurisdictional policies. Congress can then legislate again and reverse one of
these interpretations. This process is similar to the approach to abstention supported in
this Article.
268. 109 S. Ct. 2506 (1989).
269. See id at 2515-20.
270. Id at 2518.
271. Idt
272. Id at 2518-19. But see id at 2517 (the key question is whether state court action
is the type to which Younger applies).
273. Id at 2519-20.
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The pendency of the state review suit became relevant because if it
were an integral part of the legislative ratemaking process the order
would not be ripe for federal court challenge. 27 4 He characterized
the state court's review as not involving "anything other than ajudi-
cial act."127 5 Because it was not part of the legislative process there
was no ripeness problem. 276 Nor did the state court action pose a
Younger abstention problem.277 The federal court challenge was to
the Council order. The existence of a state action to review it
presented only a typical problem of parallel state and federal pro-
ceedings. ForJustice Scalia, the federal suit was "insofar as our pol-
icies of federal comity are concerned, no different in substance from
a facial challenge to an allegedly unconstitutional statute or zoning
ordinance-which we would assuredly not require to be brought in
state courts. '2
78
NOPSI is an important case. It shows, as a general matter, that the
Court is willing to apply the brakes forcefully to attempts to expand
the outer limits of Younger. The case did involve pending judicial
proceedings affecting an important state interest, 279 to which the
state was a party. NOPSI's specific significance is twofold. One key
element is the narrow approach to applying Younger abstention to
state administrative proceedings. Early decisions on the question
were ambiguous. 280 However, in Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Day-
ton Christian Schools,281 decided in 1986, a majority of the Court ap-
peared to take a hospitable approach. Dayton involved a federal
court challenge to pending state adjudicatory administrative pro-
ceedings. Justice Rehnquist's opinion for five members of the Court
not only seemed -to say that the proceedings themselves warranted
deference 28 2 but that the availability of state court judicial review
cured any problems posed by the possible inability to raise federal
constitutional claims at the administrative level.288 Read broadly
the Rehnquist opinion could support the proposition that once ad-
ministrative proceedings of any sort have commenced a federal court
must abstain from hearing challenges to them out of respect for the
state court which might be asked to review them. NOPSI cuts
274. d at 2520.
275. Id
276. Id
277. I
278. Id
279. Id. at 2516.
280. In Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Association, 457
U.S. 423 (1982), the Court directed Younger abstention in favor of a state administrative
proceeding. It emphasized, however, that the proceedings were closely related to the
functioning of the state's court system. Id at 425-27.
281. 477 U.S. 619 (1986).
282. See id at 627 n.2.
283. Id at 629.
19901
strongly in the other direction by focusing on the administrative
proceedings and indicates that they will trigger Younger abstention
only if they can be labelled "judicial." Whetherjudicial proceedings
extend to all adjudicative hearings or only to those closely related to
the judicial process remains to be clarified. 2s4 The Court also
avoided discussing why one type of proceeding before an agency
triggers abstention while another does not. In either case the
agency is not a court.
An even more remarkable aspect of NOPSI is the Court's insis-
tence on the narrow role of Younger abstention in general and the
Court's apparent invocation of the separation of powers critique to
reach this conclusion. The opening paragraph ofJustice Scalia's an-
alytical section reads like a reprint of Professor Redish's article. He
states as incontrovertible "the proposition that federal courts lack
the authority to abstain from the exercise of jurisdiction that has
been conferred," 28 5 and refers to their "duty" to exercise it.286
"Underlying these assertions is the undisputed constitutional princi-
ple that Congress, and not the judiciary, defines the scope of federal
jurisdiction within the constitutionally permissible bounds. '28 7
One might then ask how abstention is ever permissible. Justice
Scalia presents it as a narrow exception to the general duty.28 8 He
grounds it in part on equity and in part on the notion that the juris-
dictional statutes were passed against background understandings
ofjudicial discretion with respect to relief.28 9 Treating the matter as
one of relief is a little thin. For the typical Younger plaintiff it is, to
paraphrase Justice Harlan, "injunctive relief or nothing. ' 290 More-
over, Professor Shapiro, whose article Justice Scalia cites as his ma-
jor support, was referring to a broader range of discretion over
jurisdiction. 29' Justice Scalia seems uneasy about claiming any such
broad authority.
The same uncertainty about Younger, grounded in notions of sepa-
ration of powers, may help explain the Court's mystifying decision
in Deakins v. Monaghan.292 In Deakins the federal plaintiffs were the
subjects of an ongoing state grand jury proceeding. They brought a
section 1983 action seeking damages and injunctive relief against
state officials who had searched their premises and seized docu-
ments. A major issue before the Supreme Court was whether the
lower federal court should entertain the damages claim, given that
284. The Court also left open whether "an administrative proceeding to which
Younger applies [can] be challenged in federal court ... after the administrative action
has become final." NOPSI, 109 S. Ct. at 2518 n.4.
285. Id at 2512.
286. Id at 2513 (quoting Wilcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19, 40 (1909)).
287. Id
288. Id at 2518.
289. Id. at 2513.
290. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 410 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring) (stating that "[flor people in Bivens' shoes, it is
damages or nothing").
291. Shapiro, supra note 80, at 547-61 (listing examples of discretionary
determinations).
292. 484 U.S. 193 (1988).
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the state court overseeing the grand jury could not award damages.
The Court held that a stay of the federal action was the proper
course. 29
3
Younger might well justify a stay. Facts found in the damages ac-
tion could determine issues in the state criminal proceeding. This
would certainly constitute intrusion on the state's criminal processes
even though the federal proceedings were not aimed at them di-
rectly. The Court, however, declined to apply Younger in directing a
stay.294 As in NOPSI, it cited the obligation of federal courts to ex-
ercise their jurisdiction and insisted that there are only narrow ex-
ceptions to this duty.295 The obvious question is what did justify the
stay, given the general duty. The Court never said. It implied that
stays are different from dismissals. Dismissal, as opposed to a stay,
would be improper.296 Yet five years earlier, in a related context,
the Court had relied on notions of duty to exercise jurisdiction in
holding that a stay is no different from a dismissal.297 Each, the
Court then stated, is a refusal to exercise jurisdiction.
Perhaps Deakins is a sub silentio application of Younger to damages
claims, an issue thought to be still open.298 The concurring Justices
viewed this as the only plausible explanation for the decision.299
What is striking is that the Court did not wish to take this step, and
that it was troubled by the difficulties of reconciling Younger with the
asserted duty of the federal courts to exercise jurisdiction. The sep-
aration of powers critique seems very much a factor in the Court's
approach. It may have finessed for the moment the issue of
Younger's legitimacy by appearing to confine the doctrine to cases
where equitable principles govern. Even in equity cases, however,
the Court cannot forever evade the question of how it ignores the
duty which Congress has imposed.
At this point it is helpful to consider briefly developments in other
abstention doctrines. These doctrines are beyond the scope of this
Article, but, as the Court has often noted, there is a close relation-
ship between Younger and other forms of abstention.3 0 0 Moreover,
the separation of powers critique casts equal doubt on the validity of
any kind of abstention.
The Court's general tendency in other areas has been either to
293. Id. at 201-04.
294. IeL at 202.
295. Id at 202-03.
296. Id at 202-04.
297. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 27-28
(1983).
298. See Deakins, 484 U.S. at 202 & n.6.
299. Id at 207-08 (White, J., concurring).
300. E.g., Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, 481 U.S. 1, 11 n.9 (1987); see Moore v. Sims, 442
U.S. 415, 428 (1979).
restrict a doctrine or to refuse to allow any extension of it. In Ha-
waii Housing Authority v. Midkiff I a lower court judge had raised the
possibility of a state law construction that would obviate federal con-
stitutional issues. He thus suggested Pullman abstention.30 2 The
Supreme Court summarily dismissed the suggestion, stating that
"[i]n the abstract, of course, such possibilities always exist. But the
relevant inquiry is not whether there is a bare, though unlikely, pos-
sibility that state courts might render adjudication of the federal
question unnecessary." 30 3 In other recent Pullman abstention cases
the Court has quite explicitly reined in that doctrine's preference for
initial state adjudication whenever the plaintiff has attacked state ac-
tion on state as well as federal grounds.30
4
Similarly, in NOPSI the Court rejected the possibility of absten-
tion under the Burford doctrine.3 05 This doctine applies to interfer-
ence with some regulatory schemes, particularly those presenting
difficult and important questions of state law where the state has
shown particular concern with the form of review of administrative
action.306 The doctrine is of uncertain scope and has not played a
major role in recent Supreme Court decisions. Like Pullman, how-
ever, it is potentially quite inclusive. It seems that for this very rea-
son the Court in NOPSI was anxious to give Burford abstention a
narrow scope.
The most striking developments have come in the field of Colorado
River abstention, a doctrine that gives federal courts some ability to
defer to parallel state proceedings out of concerns for "wise judicial
administration. '" 3 0 7 In the original Colorado River case Justice Bren-
nan, writing for the majority, asserted that the doctrine is narrow in
scope. Nevertheless, he upheld dismissal of a federal complaint in a
case in which the interests favoring federal adjudication were signifi-
cant.308 In Will v. Calvert Fire Insurance Co.309 Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the plurality, took advantage of the Colorado River open-
ing and posited the existence of a general discretion on the part of
district court judges to defer to parallel state proceedings.3 10 Jus-
tice Brennan acted forcefully to stop this development in Moses H.
Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.311 His opinion for
the Court upheld reversal of a stay of parallel federal proceedings
301. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
302. IdL at 237 & nA. The doctrine takes its title from Railroad Commission v. Pull-
man Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941), in which the Court stated that federal court abstention is
required when state law is uncertain and a state court's clarification of state law might
make a federal court's constitutional ruling unnecessary.
303. Midkiff, 464 U.S. at 237.
304. See, e.g., City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S 451, 467-68 (1987); Wisconsin v. Con-
stantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 439 (1971).
305. The doctrine takes its name from Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
306. NOPSI, 109 S. Ct. at 2513-15.
307. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817
(1976) (quoting Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Five Equip., 342 U.S. 180, 183 (1952)).
308. See id. at 821.
309. 437 U.S. 655 (1978).
310. Id. at 664.
311. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
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and emphasized the exceptional character of the Colorado River
doctrine.3
1 2
Taken together these cases show the same ambivalence toward
abstention that NOPSI and Deakins demonstrate. On the one hand,
the Court seems to wish to preserve a core area for each abstention
doctrine. On the other hand, it is mindful of their potential to swal-
low up large chunks of federal jurisdiction. The non-Younger cases
are also noteworthy in that most of them rely heavily on the notion
of a "duty" to exercisejurisdiction. Indeed, Colorado River contains
the frequently quoted language that the federal courts have a "virtu-
ally unflagging obligation" to exercise the jurisdiction that Congress
has conferred.3 13 One could of course point to the word "virtually"
as showing that the judiciary retains room to maneuver.3 14 How-
ever, the Court's recent focus seems to be on the concept of duty.
Taken to its logical conclusion this concept would mean the end of
all abstention.
It is apparent from the recent cases that the Court feels a strong
need both to legitimize and to limit Younger and other forms of ab-
stention. The most obvious explanation for this development is that
the separation of powers critique has had a major impact. Faced
with a conflict between federalism and separation of powers the
Court leans toward the latter as the preferred and dominant consti-
tutional value. Because the recent cases discuss the problem some-
what cryptically one has to infer this, but the inference is
inescapable.
As for the two variants of the separation critique, the Court seems
more concerned with its institutional dimensions than with matters
of direct statutory command. It is true that there is an occasional
reference to the fact that Congress has acted to confer jurisdic-
tion,3 15 but there is no detailed exercise in statutory interpretation
such as one finds in Justice Brennan's opinions on Younger. The
Court no doubt is concerned about encroachment on the legislative
domain. The primary institutional concern, however, is most likely
a sense that the Court has aggrandized its own domain. The prob-
lem for the current Court is that Younger is unadorned judicial poli-
cymaking. Its decisions on the Eleventh Amendment and standing,
312. ME at 19.
313. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817.
314. Cf Shapiro, supra note 80, at 543-44 (stating that recent statements of obligation
seem "less frightening" than the first Justice Marshall's observation that to decline the
exercise of given jurisdiction would be "'treason to the constitution' ") (quoting iGo-
hens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821)).
315. E.g., NOPSI, 109 S. Ct. at 2513.
1 QQNAI 1lrs
for example, can be attacked as activist judicial formulation of re-
strictive jurisdictional doctrine,3 16 but at least there is a textual peg
to hang them on. Younger has none. It is federal common law ema-
nating from a Court that treats such lawmaking as disfavored. It is
activist statutory construction-to the extent the notion of back-
ground understandings can be treated as statutory construction-by
a Court that emphasizes adhering to the letter. Indeed the whole
exercise is jarringly out of tune with the Burger-Rehnquist Courts'
general emphasis on the subordinate role of the federal judiciary in
national policymaking. 317
The question that then arises is whether, if the Court takes the
separation of powers critique seriously, it will abandon Younger alto-
gether. One would not expect such a step from a federalist Court,
and the cases show a desire to preserve a substantial core. Even
Justice Brennan admitted that in its narrow context Younger itself is
legitimate. 318 As a matter of policy, the Younger doctrine has consid-
erable force. Stopping a state court from the initial adjudication of
a matter is considerably more intrusive than preventing it from relit-
igating a matter already decided by a federal court. The cases in
which the Younger problem arises generally present more than a sim-
ple problem of parallel proceedings in two court systems. The
question is whether the federal court system can be used to halt the
state system on the spot, or at least to seize much of the case from it.
The separation of powers critique is presented as distinct from
the policy debate over Younger.3 19 Yet, if one accepts the analysis
offered above, that argument is not conclusive in either its textual or
institutional terms. It too presents substantial questions of policy.
One is an issue of statutory interpretation: whether it is legitimate
to go beyond the texts to generalized background understandings.
The fundamental policy question that the separation of powers cri-
tique raises is one of institutional roles: is it consistent with consti-
tutional values and structure for the judiciary to share with
Congress a substantial role in matters ofjurisdiction like that which
it has played in developing the Younger doctrine?
The recent separation of powers cases themselves certainly point
in the general direction of shared responsibilities. The field of fed-
eral-state judicial relations seems particularly appropriate for this
interaction. The Court brings to bear a double expertise: its direct
familiarity with how courts operate and its overall concern for mat-
ters of federal-state balance. Maintaining this balance between our
two judicial systems seems like a perfectly natural role for the na-
tion's highest court to play.3 20 Looked at this way, the exercise in
316. E.g., Nichol, Abusing Standing: A Comment on Allen v. Wright, 133 U. PA. L. REv.
635 (1985).
317. See, e.g., Brown, Article III as a Fundamental Value-The Demise of Northern Pipeline
and Its Implication for Congressional Power, 49 OHio ST. LJ. 55, 80-83 (1988).
318. E.g., Huffinan v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 613-14 (1975) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
319. Redish, supra note 16, at 71-72 & n.5.
320. See Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, 481 U.S. 1, 11 n.9 (1987) (noting that abstention is
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jurisdictional lawmaking which Younger represents should not be
troubling to a conservative Court. It perpetuates a judicial role in
federal-state relations. ChiefJustice Rehnquist joined in the Garcia
dissent which argued forcefully for such a role,3 21 albeit in a differ-
ent context. At the same time Congress retains the ultimate say. Its
power overjurisdiction is preserved, as is its role, recognized in Gar-
cia, as the primary allocator of responsibilities within the federal sys-
tem. In sum, the Court is right in looking closely at Younger with an
eye to separation of powers concerns. These concerns, however, do
not call for its abandonment.
Conclusion
The separation of powers critique maintains that Younger absten-
tion is an illegitimate exercise by the judiciary of power that belongs
to Congress. It can be framed either as a textual proposition-that
jurisdictional and related statutes forbid Younger-or as a matter of
institutional role-that under the Constitution Congress alone pos-
sesses the power to authorize refusals to exercise jurisdiction-or
both. The critique is certainly powerful. It is tempting to view the
critique as "irrebuttable," yet the matter is not so simple. For one
thing, it rules out all abstention. Justice Brennan, the Court's fore-
most proponent of a separation of powers attack, however, admitted
the validity of Younger in its original context and of other forms of
abstention. The extent to which the statutes resolve the question
depends in large part on one's approach to construing them. Both
statutory and institutional issues hinge on how one views the
Court's role in jurisdictional matters. Particularly relevant are the
Court's recent cases on separation of powers. They tend to support
Younger and to weaken the separation of powers critique. Central to
these cases is a notion of shared functions, of overlapping areas of
competence. Certainly the Court has a good deal of competence in
the functioning of the judicial system and the harmonization of fed-
eral-state relations. It seems logical for the country's highest court
to exercise this competence, and the separation of powers cases sup-
port this common sense conclusion. Congress retains the final say.
Its supremacy over jurisdiction is unchallenged.
It is also tempting to conclude that the Court is rethinking Younger
to the point that it will be seriously curtailed if not abandoned. De-
velopments in other abstention doctrines suggest this, as does the
latest Younger case. It is true that the Court appears troubled by the
"designed to soften the tensions inherent in a system that contemplates parallel judicial
processes").
321. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 567 (1985) (Powell,
J., dissenting).
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separation critique, and that in a conflict between federalism and
separation of powers the latter doctrine will be the preferred struc-
tural constitutional value. Younger is very much alive, however, as
the 1987 Pennzoil decision3 22 suggests.
Rather than a retrenchment we are likely to see a rethinking of
Younger. One positive effect would be an open discussion of where
the doctrine comes from. In the past the Court has suggested it has
statutory roots only to say later that it is divorced from statute.
Younger may have begun as an equity doctrine, but the Court has
explicitly and implicitly moved away from that explanation. A re-
turn to equity is possible, although that would pose problems in
damages cases. The Court may try to solve the authority question as
a matter of statutory construction. With respect to the statutes,
however, the main task is showing that they do not prevent Younger,
rather than that they are the source of authority for it. Perhaps au-
thority lies in the underlying concept of the judicial power of Article
III. In any event open acknowledgement of the authority problem
might also lead the Court to discuss explicitly what values it is con-
sidering. The role of the state courts seems paramount, but the
Court might well explore whether the key is respect for them as in-
stitutions of semi-sovereign states or whether the key is a federal
interest in state adjudication of federal matters.3 23 A direct result of
any general reexamination of Younger might be to decline to apply it
when the state institutions involved are not judicial. Prior cases de-
ferring to state executive and administrative actions may fall.324 A
core, and a substantial one at that, will remain. In the end that is a
policy decision. It admits of no easy answer. It is one the Court can
legitimately make.
322. Pennzoil Co., 481 U.S. 1 (1987) (extending Younger to civil proceedings in which
the state is not a party but in which its system of enforcing judgments is challenged).
323. See Althouse, supra note 49, at 1083-90.
324. E.g., Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); see Althouse, supra note 49, at 1059-
90 (arguing against abstention in such cases).
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